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A GENERALIZATION OF THE SHAPLEYICHIISHI RESULT
AND
ITS APPLICATION TO CONVEX GAMES
Soa Grahn

 Jeroen Kuipers

 Dries Vermeulen
y
and Mark Voorneveld
z
Abstract
In this paper we present a generalization of the ShapleyIchiishi result for convex
games to the class of all exact games Then we discuss two applications to the class
of convex games First we show that it can indeed be used to give an alternative
proof of the ShapleyIchiishi result Secondly we use our generalization to derive the
minimal dening system of linear inequalities of the class of convex games
 Introduction
Convex games are interesting from more than one perspective First of all results on convex games
can be applied to a wide range of practical game models such as unanimity games bankruptcy
games ONeill 	 Aumann and Maschler 
 and sequencing games Curiel et al 
From a theoretical perspective convex games are interesting because the core of a convex game
has a particularly regular form as well as several other pleasant properties For example Shapley
 showed that the core of a convex game is the unique stable set of that game and that it is
the convex hull of the marginal vectors of that game Ichiishi  showed that the converse of
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the latter statement is also true if the core of a game is equal to the convex hull of its marginal
vectors then the game is necessarily convex
This twoway result of Shapley and Ichiishi a game is convex if and only if its marginal vectors
are core elements is very useful because it enables us for example to check fairly easily whether a
game is convex
In this paper we will present a theorem that can be seen as a generalization of the ShapleyIchiishi
result We will rst explain the contents of our theorem and then elaborate on its implications
for the class of convex games
THE GENERALIZATION First we will prove a generalization of the ShapleyIchiishi result on the
class of exact games Within this class we can identify equivalence classes of games whose cores
have the same combinatorial structure This combinatorial structure can be expressed in terms of
the coalitions that dene extreme points of the core In its turn this way to describe equivalence
classes is a generalization of the way orderings of players dene marginal vectors the extreme
points of the core
We show that these equivalence classes one of them is the class of convex games can be given in
terms of linear inequalities on the polyhedral class of all exact games The proof of this statement
is based on a geometrical interpretation of combinatorial equivalence
APPLICATIONS TO CONVEX GAMES In the second part of the paper we will give two applications
of this result to the class of convex games The rst application is the derivation of the Shapley
Ichiishi result We show that the class of exact games associated via the combinatorial equivalence
relation with a strictly exact game is precisely the collection of convex games Since for this specic
strictly convex game it can easily be seen that its core equals the convex hull of all its marginal
vectors we get an alternative proof of the ShapleyIchiishi theorem
A second application is the derivation of the minimal dening system of linear inequalities of the
class of convex games The set of linear inequalities we get from our generalization when applied to
the collection of convex games is a strict subset of the system of linear inequalities that is normally
used to dene convexity We will show that in this specic setting it is even the minimal system
of linear inequalities each inequality in this system is facetdening So leaving it out would
enlarge the set of games satisfying the remaining system of inequalities
 Cooperative games
A transferable utility game or TUgame is a pair N v where N  f     ng is the set of players
of the game and v is a function that assigns to each coalition S  N its value vS  IR The value
v of the empty set is assumed to be equal to zero
	
Throughout this paper we will keep the player set N xed So we will simplify our notation a bit
and write v instead of N v to denote a game The sum game vw of two games v and w is dened
by vwS  vSwS and for a real number  the game v is dened by vS  vS
The collection of all TUgames with player set N  equipped with these operations is a vector
space
One convenient basis for this vector space was introduced in Shapley 
 Let T be a nonempty
coalition in the player set N  The corresponding unanimity game u
T
is dened as follows
u
T
S 

 if T  S
 otherwise
Shapley 
 proved that the collection of unanimity games forms a basis of the vector space of
all games In other words given a game v there exist unique coecients 
T

T 
such that
v 
X
T 

T
u
T

Many classes of games like airport games Littlechild and Owen  and sequencing games
Curiel et al  can be characterized through restrictions on these coecients
CORE OF A GAME AND EXACTNESS A vector x  IR
N
will be called an allocation The i
th
coordinate x
i
of the allocation x represents the payo to player i  N  For coalition S  N  the
aggregate payo
P
iS
x
i
is denoted by xS An allocation x is called ecient if it distributes the
value of the grand coalition among the players ie if xN  vN An ecient allocation x is
called a core allocation if
xS  vS for all S  N
The set of core allocations denoted by Cv is called the core of the game v A game whose core
is not empty is called balanced A game v is called exact if for every coalition S there exists an
allocation x in the core of v with xS  vS Notice that for every balanced game v the game w
dened by
wS  minfxS j x is an element of the core of vg
is the unique exact game that has the same core as v
CONVEX GAMES Now we focus on the class of convex games A game v is called convex if it
satises the inequalities
vS  vT   vS  T   vS  T  
for all coalitions S and T  Notice that with respect to the game v these inequalities are linear
Hence the set of convex games is polyhedral A game that whenever possible strictly satises the
inequalities  that is whenever S is not a subset of T and T is not a subset of S is called strictly

convex A game is strictly convex if and only if it is an element of the interior of the polyhedral
set of convex games
One of the main results on convex games is the ShapleyIchiishi theorem It can be stated as follows
Let v be a TUgame Consider for a given permutation  of the player set N the corresponding
marginal vector m

v dened by
m

v
k
 vS

k
 vS

k

for each player k  N  where S

k
is dened to be
S

k
 fj j j  kg
for each   k  n The result of Shapley  and Ichiishi  is
Theorem  The game v is convex if an only if for each permutation  the corresponding
marginal vector m

v is an element of the core of v
It is straightforward to show that in this case the collection of all extreme points of the core
coincides with the collection of marginal vectors The observation that for a convex game all
marginal vectors are core elements was rst made by Shapley  The converse statement is
due to Ichiishi 
One other issue in this paper is the inequalities needed to dene the class of convex games Ichiishi
 showed that a game v is convex if and only if it satises the increasing marginal contributions
imc inequalities the inequalities of the form
vT  fig vT   vS  fig vS 
for all S  T and i  T  So not all inequalities in  are needed We will show that even the
above system  still has some redundancy
 The generalization
First we will present a generalization of the ShapleyIchiishi result to general classes of exact
TUgames
In this section we restrict ourselves to the class of exact games Let v be an exact TUgame and
let x be an allocation A coalition S with xS  vS is called tight at x in the game v The
collection of coalitions that are tight at x in v is denoted by T v x Furthermore a core allocation
x is called extreme if for any two core allocations y and z of v the equality x 


y 


z implies
that x  y  z

 Dene
T v  fT v x j x is an extreme point of the core of vg

In other words fxg is a face of the core of v

We say that two games v and w are equivalent if
T v  T w
Remark The set T v fully captures the combinatorial structure of the core of v in the following
sense Let F be a face of the core of v A coalition S is said to be tight at F if
xS  vS
holds for all allocations x in F  The set of tight coalitions at F is denoted by T F 

 The
collection
fT F  j F is a face of the core of vg
is called the combinatorial structure of v Now two games are called combinatorially equivalent if
they generate the same combinatorial structure It is not dicult to show that equivalence and
combinatorial equivalence are identical notions 
In order to characterize the closure of an equivalence class of the game v we say that the game w
is a limiting case of v if for every extreme point x of the core of v there exists an extreme point y
of the core of w such that T v x is a subset of T w y
The collection of limiting cases of v is denoted by Lv Note that equivalent games are limiting
cases of each other Note also that by the ShapleyIchiishi theorem the collection of limiting cases
of a strictly convex game is precisely the collection of convex games
We will show that Lv is a polyhedral cone In particular we will describe how given a game v
we can derive a dening system of linear inequalities for the polyhedral cone Lv
Let x be an extreme point of the core of v A minimal characterizing set of x in v is a subset B of
T v x such that the unique solution to the system
yS  vS
for all S in B is x and such that no subset of B has this property Equivalently B is a basis of
IR
n

 Since x is an extreme point of the core of v we know that T v x spans IR
N
 and hence
contains at least one minimal characterizing set of x in v
Now given the exact game v we construct a collection of linear inequalities on the set of games
as follows Take two not necessarily distinct extreme points x and y of the core of v Suppose

The face F is characterized by T F  in the sense that F is precisely the collection of core allocations
x for which xS  vS holds for all S in T F 

This is a slight abuse of terminology Ocially we should say that fe
S
j S  Bg is a basis of IR
N



that in v we have a minimal characterizing set B for x and a minimal characterizing set C for
y such that jB  Cj  n   generically this will imply that x and y are neighboring extreme
points Take the unique coalition T in C that is not an element of B Since B is a basis for IR
n
we can nd uniquely determined real numbers S for S  B such that
e
T

X
SB
Se
S

where e
S
 IR
N
denotes the characteristic vector of the coalition S The linear inequality generated
by these choices is
wT  
X
SB
SwS
The collection of inequalities thus generated is denoted by Iv
Lemma  The inequalities in Iv imply that
wT  
X
SB
SwS
in case x  y or equivalently if T is an element of T v x
Proof Let x y B C and T be as above with the additional assumption that x  y We will
show that the inequality
wT  
X
SB
SwS
is implied by the inequalities in Iv Let U be the unique coalition that is an element of B but
not of C Consider the expression
e
T

X
SB
Se
S
 Ue
U

X
SB
S U
Se
S
Since C is a basis and B nfUg is a subset of C at least we know that U 	  Now if U 	 
we have that
e
U


U
e
T

X
SB
S U
S
U
e
S


U
e
T

X
SC
S T
S
U
e
S
which generates the inequality
wU 

U
wT 
X
SC
S T
S
U
wS
Using the fact that U 	  this can be rewritten to
wT  
X
SB
SwS

So assume that U 
  In this case the equality
e
T
 Ue
U

X
SB
S U
Se
S
implies that there is at least one coalition V in B with V 	 U and V  	  Now notice that
the collection D  B n fV g fTg must be a basis

 Consequently D determines the extreme
point x while clearly jB Dj  n  Thus the equation
e
V


V 
e
T

X
SB
S V
S
V 
e
S
generates the inequality
wV  

V 
wT 
X
SB
S V
S
V 
wS
This can be rewritten to
wT  
X
SB
SwS
which shows our claim 
In the proof of the main theorem in this section we need one more lemma
Lemma  Let v be an exact game and let w be a game that satises all inequalities in Iv
Let y be an extreme point in the core of v and let B be a basis in T v y Let z be the unique
solution to the system of equalities
xS  wS for all S  B
Then T v y is a subset of T w z
Proof Take a coalition T in T v y We will show that T is included in T w z First notice
that zT   wT  holds when T is an element of B by the denition of z So suppose that T is
an element of T v y that is not included in B Take a minimal characterizing set C of y in v that
includes T and such that T is the unique element of C that is not an element of B Write
e
T

X
SB
Se
S

Since B and C dene the same extreme point in v by lemma  the game w automatically satises
the equality
wT  
X
SB
SwS

This follows from the facts that D has exactly n elements and that D is necessarily independent
If it were not independent then either B could not be a basis or we would have found a way to
write e
T
as a linear combination of the elements e
S
with S  B without using e
V
 which would
violate the uniqueness of the coecients

zT   hz e
T
i 
X
SB
SzSHence

X
SB
SwS
 wT 
which proves our claim 
This enables us to prove the main theorem
Theorem  A game w is a limiting case of v if and only if it satises the inequalities in Iv
Proof We shall rst prove the easy direction Let w be a limiting case of v We will show that
w satises the inequalities in Iv To this end take two neighboring extreme points x and y of
the core of v and let B and C be two minimal characterizing sets in v for x and y respectively such
that jB  Cj  n  Take the unique coalition T in C that is not an element of B and take real
numbers S for S  B such that
e
T

X
SB
Se
S

We will show that w satises the corresponding inequality
To this end let a be an extreme point of the core of w such that T v x is a subset of T w a
This can be done because w is a limiting case of v Then we have
wT   aT   ha e
T
i 
X
SB
Sha e
S
i

X
SB
SaS

X
SB
SwS
where the inequality follows from the fact that a is a core element of w and for the last equality
we use the fact that aS  wS for all coalitions S in
B  T v x  T w a
Now suppose conversely that a game w satises all inequalities in Iv We will show that w is a
limiting case of v In order to show this take an extreme point y in the core of v Take a basis B
in T v y Since B is a basis we know that the system of equalities
xS  wS for all S  B
has a unique solution say z By lemma 	 we already know that T v y is a subset of T w z So
we only need to show that z is a core element of w

In order to do that rst notice that z is ecient because the grand coalition N  T v y is also
an element of T w z by lemma 	 and hence zN  wN
Now take an arbitrary coalition T  We will show that zT   wT  Consider the following linear
program
minhe
T
 xi
st x  Cv
Solving this linear program by means of the simplex algorithm using starting point y

 y and
basis B

 B for the initialization yields a sequence
y

     y
k
of extreme points of the core of v together with a basis B
m
for each point y
m
 Moreover since
v is assumed to be exact we know that y
k
T   vT  And from the properties of the simplex
algorithm we know that
jB
m
 B
m
j  n 
and that
he
T
 y
m
 y
m
i  
Now compute for each B
m
the unique solution z
m
to the system
xS  wS for all S  B
m
of linear equalities First we will show that there exists a 
m
  such that
z
m
 z
m
 
m
y
m
 y
m

If y
m
 y
m
 then by lemma 	 we know that also z
m
 z
m
 So in this case we can take

m
  Now assume that y
m
is not equal to y
m
 Write
z  z
m
 y
m
 y
m

Let T
m
be the unique coalition in B
m
nB
m
 Take real numbers 
m
S for S  B
m
such that
e
T
m

X
SB
m

m
Se
S

By assumption the game w satises the inequality
wT
m
 
X
SB
m

m
SwS
Thus
z
m
T
m
 
X
SB
m

m
Sz
m
S

X
SB
m

m
SwS  wT
m


Furthermore since y
m
is not equal to y
m
 we know that T
m
is not tight on y
m
 Thus
he
T
m
 y
m
 y
m
i 
  and this in its turn implies that

m
 maxf j zT
m
  wT
m
g
exists and is not negative We will show that z
m
  z
m
 To this end notice that all
coalitions S in B
m
 B
m
are tight on all z in the game w because they are tight on z
m
in
w and on both y
m
and y
m
in v Moreover T
m
is tight on z
m
 in w by the denition of

m
 So all coalitions in B
m
are tight on z
m
 in w Hence z
m
 coincides with z
m

Now we will show that zT   wT  First of all notice that T is an element of T v y
k
 by
construction So by lemma 	 z
k
T   wT  Hence
wT   z
k
T   he
T
 z
k
i  he
T
 z

i
k
X
m
he
T
 z
m
 z
m
i
 z

T  
k
X
m

m
he
T
 y
m
 y
m
i
 zT 
where the nal inequality follows from the two facts that for all   m  k   we have both

m
  and he
T
 y
m
 y
m
i   This concludes the proof 
Remark The dening system Iv of the polyhedral set Lv we derived in this section does not
need to be minimal
	
for an arbitrary exact game Consider for example the following TUgame
with player set N  f 	  g
vS 





































 if S   or S  
	 if S  	 or S  

 if S  	 or S   or S  	
 if S  
	 if S  	 or S  

 if jSj   and   S
 if S  	
 if S  N 
This is indeed an exact game Each coalition is tight on either one of the following six extreme
	
See the appendix for a precise denition of a minimal dening system

points of the core of v the ones in which player  is only a member of the tight coalition N
a    	 	
b    	 	
c   	  	
d   	  	
e     	
f   
 
 
or on at least one of the three extreme core elements  
     
  and   	  Now
for the six extreme core elements above we can check that
T v a  f  	 Ng
T v b  f 	 	 Ng
T v c  f	 	 	 Ng
T v d  f	 	 	 Ng
T v e  f	  	 Ng
T v f  f 	  Ng
Thus the graph of neighboring extreme points restricted to these six points looks as follows
f
e
d
a
b
c
Each edge in this graph induces an inequality For example the inequality f 
 e is generated by
writing e

as a linear combination of the characteristic vectors corresponding to the elements
in T v f
e

 e

 e

 e


The inequalities thus induced by the edges in this graph are
w	  w	  w wf 
 e
w  w	 w	e
 a
w	  w	  w  wa
 b
w	  w	 wb
 c

w	  w	 w	  w	c
 d
w  w	 w	d
 e
Notice that the inequality e
 a is implied by inequalities b
 c and c
 d Symmetrically
d
 e is implied by a
 b and b
 c 
 Application to convex games
The previous result on arbitrary exact games has several implications in case the game in question
happens to be convex


 It can for example be used to show a version of the ShapleyIchiishi
result This is what we will do rst in this section We will also show how it can be used to derive
a minimal dening system for the polyhedral set of convex games
To this end consider the game v

dened by
v

S  s

for each coalition where s  jSj It is easy to check that this is a convex game and that
v

S  v

T   v

S  T   v

S  T 
if and only if S  T or T  S

 Thus the game v

is strictly convex
In order to apply our generalization to convex games we need the following two observations
concerning v


Lemma  An allocation is an extreme point of the core of v

if and only if it is a marginal
vector of v


Proof Let m

v

 be a marginal vector of v

 Assume wlog that  is the identity Thus the
payo to player i equals i

 i 

 	i  and for a nonempty coalition S with jSj  s we
get that
m

v

S 
X
iS
	i  
s
X
i
	i   	 

	
ss  s  s

 v

S
Conversely assume that x is an extreme element of the core of v

 Since T v

 x spans IR
N
 it
suces to show that for any two coalitions S and T that are tight on x in v

we have either S  T
or T  S To this end notice that
v

S  T   v

S  T   xS  T   xS  T   xS  xT   v

S  v

T 


Notice that convex games are indeed exact

This can be seen as follows Write a  jS n T j b  jT n Sj and k  jS  T j Then vS  vT  
a  k

 b  k

and vS  T   vS  T   a  k  b

 k

which happens to be greater or
equal to the previous expression Strict inequality occurs if and only if ab 	  in other words if
a 	  and b 	 
	
So by the convexity of v


v

S  T   v

S  T   v

S  v

T 
which implies that S  T or T  S because v

is strictly convex 
Theorem  Let v

be the strictly convex game dened above Then the system Iv

 is precisely
the system of inequalities
vS  fi jg vS  fjg  vS  fig vS   
for each coalition S and players i and j not in S
Proof It is straightforward to show for each marginal vector m

v

 that
T v

m

v

  fS

k
j k  Ng
Thus each T v

m

v

 is the unique minimal characterizing set of m

v

 in v

 This enables
us to derive the system Iv

 for this particular game v


In order to do this let m

v

 and m

v

 be two extreme points of v

with
jT v

m

v

  T v

m

v

j  n 
Let T be the unique coalition in T v

m

v

 that is not an element of T v

m

v

 It is not so
dicult to show that there is a coalition S and two players i and j not in S such that the coalitions
S S  fig and S  fi jg are all three elements of T v

m

v

 while
T  S  fjg
Thus from the fact that
e
T
 e
Sfjg
 e
Sfijg
 e
Sfig
 e
S
we get that the inequality in Iv

 generated by these choices is exactly
wS  fjg  wS  fi jg wS  fig  wS
which can be rewritten to
wS  fi jg wS  fjg  wS  fig wS
Conversely each inequality of this form can be obtained by an appropriate choice of  and   Thus
Iv

 is precisely our system    

APPLICATION I THE SHAPLEYICHIISHI RESULT The above observations concerning the game v

can now be used to derive the result of Shapley and Ichiishi
Theorem  A game v is convex if and only if it is a limiting case of v


Proof Suppose that v is convex Observe that an inequality of the form
vS  fi jg vS  fjg  vS  fig vS
is simply a special case of an imc inequality for T  S  fjg Hence by theorem  v is a limiting
case of v


Suppose conversely that v is a limiting case of v

 It is sucient to prove the imc inequalities 
So let S and T be two coalitions such that S  T and let i be a player who is not a member of T 
We will prove that
vT  fig vT   vS  fig vS
If T  S the inequality is trivial so assume that T 	 S Write T n S  fi

     i
m
g Repeated
application of the inequalities given in theorem  yields
vT  fig vT   vS  fi

     i
m
g  fig vS  fi

     i
m
g
 vS  fi

     i
m
g  fig vS  fi

     i
m
g
  
 vS  fi

g  fig vS  fi

g
 vS  fig vS
This concludes the proof 
This theorem boils down to the result of Shapley and Ichiishi saying that a game is convex if and
only if its core is the convex hull of all marginal vectors This can be seen as follows
Corollary ShapleyIchiishi A game v is convex if and only if all marginal vectors of v are
elements of the core of v
Proof The previous theorem states that a game v is convex if and only if it is a limiting case
of v

 But for the game v

we know by lemma  that each extreme point of the core is a marginal
vector and conversely that each marginal vector is an element of its core Thus a game v is a
limiting case of v

if and only if all marginal vectors m

v are elements of the core of v 
APPLICATION II A MINIMAL DEFINING SYSTEM A second application is the derivation of the
minimal dening system see appendix of the polyhedral set of convex games In this section we
will explain how this can be done

First notice that the space of convex games is indeed a polyhedral set since the dening system of
inequalities
vS  vT   vS  T   vS  T 
is linear And since the game v

satises all inequalities strictly unless S  T or T  S it is also
of full dimension So according to proposition  in the appendix there exists a unique minimal
dening system for the polyhedral set of convex games
However the above dening system is not minimal For example the imc inequalities  dened
by Ichiishi are also sucient Still also this system doesnt satisfy the minimality requirement
of a minimal dening system and there is some redundancy left This is clear once we have the
following immediate consequence of theorems  and 
Theorem  A game v is convex if and only if it satises the set Iv

 of inequalities of the
form
vS  fi jg vS  fjg  vS  fig vS   
for each coalition S and players i and j not in S
It is not known to us for precisely which polyhedral sets Lv of exact games the dening system
Iv will be minimal But now we will show that the system Iv

 is the minimal dening system
of the set Lv

 of convex games For that we need the following statement
Theorem  The following two conditions are equivalent
a The game v is convex
b For all i j  N i 	 j and each coalition S that does not contain i and j
X
TS

Tfijg
 
where the numbers 
T
are the unique unanimity coecients dened in section 
Proof By theorem 
 it suces to prove the equivalence of  and b Write v 
P
T 

T
u
T

Let i and j be two players and let S be a coalition that does not contain i and j Then
vS  fi jg vS  fjg  vS  fig vS

vS  fi jg vS  fjg vS  fig vS  

h
P
TSfijg

T

P
TSfjg

T
i

h
P
TSfig

T

P
TS

T
i
 

P
TSfjg

Tfig

P
TS

Tfig
 

P
TS

Tfijg
 



which concludes the proof 
This theorem enables us to prove that a further reduction of the number of inequalities is not
possible In order to see why this is so let i and j be two players and let S be a coalition that
does not contain i and j In order to show that the condition
vS  fi jg vS  fjg  vS  fig vS
is not redundant we construct a game that violates exactly the convexity condition corresponding
to the triplet S i j while still satisfying all other conditions Consider the game v 
P
T

T
u
T
with

T







 if T  S  fi jg
 if T  S  fig or T  S  fjg or T 	 S  fi jg
 otherwise
Then
P
TS

Tfijg
  
  so the condition for S i j is indeed violated
In order to show that all other inequalities are satised let k and l be two dierent players and
let V be a coalition such that the triplet V k l does not equal the triplet S i j Consider the
quantity
X
TV

Tfklg

If 
Sfijg
does not appear in this summation the sum only concerns nonnegative terms and is
hence nonnegative If 
Sfijg
does appear in the summation discern two cases
a If V 	 S and fi jg  fk lg The fact that 
Sfijg
appears in the above sum implies that the
set S is a subset of V  So since V 	 S we can choose m  V nS Then 
fmgfklg
  appears in
the sum too compensating for 
Sfijg
  and consequently yielding a nonnegative outcome
b If fi jg 	 fk lg Assume without loss of generality that i is not an element of fk lg Since

Sfijg
  appears in the sum also 
Sfjg
  appears in it compensating the negative
number and hence yielding a nonnegative outcome 
A brief nal remark on the complexity of our minimal test for convexity There are

n


ways to
choose two dierent players i and j in N  and 	
n
ways to choose a coalition S that doesnt
contain players i and j Thus we have 	
n

n


conditions of the form
vS  fi jg vS  fjg  vS  fig vS
Now 	
n

n




n
nn

conditions seems to be quite a lot until one realizes that the game itself
is dened on its 	
n
coalitions In other words the input size is not the number of players n but the
number of coalitions x  	
n
 Thus testing

n
nn

conditions is only of complexity Oxlog x


while the original system  has complexity Ox

 The complexity of the imc system  of
Ichiishi is of order Ox


logx

Appendix Dening systems
In this appendix we will explain in a general setting what the minimal dening system of a
polyhedral set exactly is All of our assertions in this section are wellknown We only repeat them
here for convenience
The dimension of a convex subset C of IR
n
is dened to be the dimension of the smallest ane
subspace that contains C It is denoted by dimC Let A be an m  n matrix and let b be an
element of IR
m
 The solution set
P  fx  IR
n
j Ax  bg
of the system Ax  b of linear inequalities is called a polyhedron Evidently every polyhedron is
convex
A closed subset F of P is called a face of P if any x and y in P are elements of F if and only if


x 


y is an element of F  Since P is convex a face must also be convex Thus each face has a
dimension and a face with dimension dimP   is called a facet
MINIMAL DEFINING SYSTEMS Now let P be a polyhedron in IR
n
of full dimension meaning that
dimP   n So the dimension of each facet is equal to n  in this case Any m n matrix A
and vector b such that
P  fx  IR
n
j Ax  bg
is called a dening system for P  Let A
i
denote the i
th
row of the matrix A A dening system
A b is called minimal if for each and every   i  m the collection of points x in IR
n
that satisfy
A
j
x  b
j
for all j 	 i
strictly includes P 
We can also talk about minimal dening systems in terms of subsets of the set of inequalities used
to dene P  To make this a little more precise take a collection I  f    mg of indices Then
the set of inequalities
A
i
x  b
i
for all i  I
is a minimal dening system of P if and only if
i suciency the set of points x satisfying the inequalities
A
i
x  b
i
for all i  I
is exactly P  and
ii necessity for each j  I there is a point x that violates the inequality A
j
x  b
j
 but satises
A
i
x  b
i
for all i  I with i not equal to j

It can be shown that in some sense each fulldimensional polyhedron has a unique minimal dening
system We will explain why this should be so We start with the existence of a minimal dening
system A row A
i
of A denes a face of P in the following way Dene
F
i
 fx  P j A
i
x  b
i
g
It can easily be shown that each F
i
is a face of P 
Now let I be a maximal collection of indices i for which F
i
is a facet and such that for all i and j
in I  F
i
	 F
j
whenever i 	 j Then here we need P to be of full dimension we have the following
result
Proposition  The collection of linear inequalities
A
i
x  b
i
for all i  I
is a minimal dening system for P 
The fact that all minimal dening systems are essentially identical can be seen in a couple of
dierent ways Here is one of them With each i  I we can associate the halfspace
H
i
 fx  IR
n
j A
i
x  b
i
g
Thus we get that P 

iI
H
i

because I is a dening system of P  And because of the minimality we end up with a polyhedron
that strictly includes P if we leave out one or more halfspaces in this intersection
It is not too dicult to show that these halfspaces are really unique in the formal sense In other
words any nite intersection of halfspaces that results in P will include these ones
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